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Runs in this tab. Nothing is uploaded.

See what Windows Recall kept.

Drop a user's CoreAIPlatform.00 folder, the hives or a whole collection. See whether Recall was there, allowed and used, and over what period; for readable stores, search every snapshot with its screenshot, app, window title, URL and OCR text.

  • Status, policies and snapshots
  • Nothing leaves your browser
  • Never decrypts protected stores

Drop a Recall folder, the hives or a collection

CoreAIPlatform.00 (or its UKP\{GUID} folder with ukg.db, ukg.db-wal and ImageStore), NTUSER.DAT, SOFTWARE, a KAPE or Velociraptor zip, a .tar.gz, or the .jpg and .json files of a decrypted Recall export.

The sample is alice's store on FIN-WKS-07, a fictional workstation: synthetic drawings, not real screenshots, in the unencrypted format of the June 2024 preview.

A Recall store is a screen history. It is read in this tab, in a Web Worker; nothing is uploaded, and screenshots are drawn from memory.

Collect a Recall store

Recall keeps each user's store in %LOCALAPPDATA%\CoreAIPlatform.00\UKP\{GUID}, and its policy in the SOFTWARE and NTUSER.DAT hives. Check the status on the live machine first: on a released build the content is encrypted and only the presence, sizes, times and policies are readable offline.

  1. Check status and policy, then copy the folder and the hives
  2. Drop the folder or the archive here
  3. Read in your browser, never uploaded
Command Prompt · administrator
Dism /Online /Get-FeatureInfo /FeatureName:Recall
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsAI"
rem The logged-on user's policy (another user: HKU\<SID>\SOFTWARE\Policies\...):
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsAI"
dir /a /s "C:\Users\alice\AppData\Local\CoreAIPlatform.00\UKP"

Dism says whether the Recall optional feature is installed and enabled; the two policy keys say what the machine and the user's policy allow (the user's own opt-in is not stored in a documented place). Note the build (winver) and whether the device is managed: Microsoft removes Recall from managed commercial devices unless a policy allows it.

Before you start

  • Legal authority first: a Recall store is a screen history and can hold third parties' messages, health or financial data, privileged communications and passwords. Collect only what your warrant, consent or policy covers.
  • Collect early and together: ukg.db, ukg.db-wal and ukg.db-shm belong together, and Recall deletes snapshots when its storage or age limit is reached, when the user deletes history, and when a policy turns it off.
  • On a released build the store is encrypted: copying it preserves evidence of presence, size and times, not readable content. This guide does not cover getting around Windows Hello or the VBS enclave.
  • Users in the European Economic Area can export their own snapshots, encrypted with their export code; Microsoft documents how a chosen app decrypts them into .jpg and .json files, which this tool reads.

Reference

What Windows Recall is

Recall is a Windows 11 feature of Copilot+ PCs (computers with a neural processing unit of at least 40 TOPS). Once a user opts in, it saves snapshots of the screen periodically while the content changes, reads its text with on-device OCR and indexes it, so the user can search what they saw. Each snapshot carries the time, the app, the window title and, in supported browsers, the address.

For an investigation it is a screen history. It can hold what exists nowhere else (a chat, a document shown in a browser, a password shown on screen) and show what a user had in front of them just before an incident. It is also a store that someone with the user's access may have read.

Versions, and what is readable in each

  • June 2024 preview (Windows 11 24H2, build 26100, on early Copilot+ PCs and test machines): a plain SQLite database, ukg.db, and one JPEG per snapshot in ImageStore, readable by any process running as the user, as Kevin Beaumont and Alexander Hagenah (TotalRecall) showed. Microsoft withdrew it before release. This tool reads these stores fully.
  • Reworked version (Windows Insider builds from November 2024; on Copilot+ PCs from the April 2025 update KB5055627, build 26100.3915): opt-in, removable, Windows Hello required. Microsoft states that snapshots and the vector database are always encrypted, with keys protected by the TPM and used only inside a VBS enclave. Securelist (October 2025) found ukg.db encrypted; Hagenah (2026) describes per-page AES-256-GCM. Offline these files cannot be read: the tool lists them with their sizes and times and says so.
  • Exports, in the European Economic Area only: a user may export their snapshots, encrypted with their 32-character export code. Microsoft documents how an app the user chooses decrypts them into a .jpg and a .json per snapshot. The tool reads those decrypted pairs; it does not decrypt exports.
  • On a live machine, Microsoft states that content leaves the enclave only after Windows Hello, in the user's session. Researchers have shown that code running in that session can read what Recall displays after authentication (Hagenah, TotalRecall Reloaded, 2026; Microsoft says it works as designed). This tool works on files, offline, and does not go there.

Where the files are

  • %LOCALAPPDATA%\CoreAIPlatform.00\UKP\{GUID}\ukg.db: the index (window events, apps, URLs, OCR text), with ukg.db-wal and ukg.db-shm when present.
  • …\UKP\{GUID}\ImageStore\<token>: one screenshot per capture, named by its row's ImageToken, without extension (JPEG in the 2024 preview).
  • …\UKP\{GUID}\SemanticTextStore.sidb and SemanticImageStore.sidb: the vector indexes behind semantic search (not read here).
  • SOFTWARE and each NTUSER.DAT, under Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsAI: AllowRecallEnablement (machine only), DisableAIDataAnalysis, AllowRecallExport, storage and retention limits, app and site filters.
  • Microsoft does not document the store's layout on released builds: collect the whole UKP folder (KAPE's WindowsCopilotRecall target does).

What a snapshot proves, and what it does not

  • It shows what was on screen at the time of its row: the window, its title and the text OCR read. It does not show that the user read it, typed it or acted on it.
  • Gaps prove nothing. Recall saves nothing until the user opts in, while paused, for private browsing in supported browsers, for filtered apps and sites, for DRM-protected content, and, on released builds, when content looks sensitive; Microsoft documents that it does not save Remote Desktop Connection, VMConnect, Azure Virtual Desktop and RemoteApp windows.
  • A missing store usually means Recall never saved anything for that user; on its own it is not a sign of wiping. Deleting history, a policy turning saving off and the storage limit all delete snapshots.
  • Times: the tool reads WindowCapture.TimeStamp as Unix milliseconds in UTC, as TotalRecall and Velociraptor do, and names any other magnitude it meets. Check a snapshot against another artifact (browser history, Windows Timeline, event logs) before building on it.

How the tool reads it

  • A SQLite file reader written for the site (ported from Windows Timeline Parser's): no SQL engine, every page, record and overflow chain bounded and checked, the -wal applied frame by frame with its checksums, committed transactions only.
  • Rows are mapped by column name: WindowCapture joined to App, Web and File through their relation tables, and the OCR text from WindowCaptureTextIndex_content (c0: the capture's Id; c2: the text; c1: the window title, as Velociraptor's Windows.Forensics.Recall artifact and Hagenah's 2026 table list read it).
  • The database is read with and without its -wal: rows only in the -wal, rows the -wal changes, and rows the -wal deletes (read back from the main file) are marked.
  • Screenshots are matched by ImageToken and drawn from blob: URLs made in the page from your own files, only when they are JPEG or PNG within the size limits. Exports never include images.
  • Files with no known header and near-random bytes (7.9 bits per byte or more) are reported as encrypted, with their sizes and times. The tool never tries to decrypt them.

Limits

  • Released, encrypted stores cannot be read offline: the tool says Recall was there, for whom, how large, and over what period the files were written. Nothing more.
  • The schema comes from public research on the 2024 preview and the tables Hagenah listed in 2026; Microsoft does not document it. Another build is read as far as the names match, and the raw columns are always shown.
  • Not read: the vector indexes, the -shm file, free pages (no carving), the user's own Recall settings and the optional-feature state (no public source documents where an offline image keeps them).
  • Retention is described two ways by Microsoft: Manage Recall says that without a duration policy snapshots stay until the storage limit; the Policy CSP gives 90 days as the default duration. The tool reports what is stored and does not infer deletions from either.
  • Bounds: 1 GB per database or hive, 2 million rows, 200,000 characters of OCR text per snapshot and 64 million per store, 500,000 window events, images up to 64 MB and 64 megapixels.

Privacy and legal authority

  • A Recall store is a screen history. It can hold third parties' messages, health or financial data, privileged communications and passwords. Collect and read it only under a clear legal authority (warrant, consent, policy) and keep no more than you need.
  • This page reads the files in your browser and sends nothing: no upload, no server that receives files, no third-party request from the tool. Screenshots exist only as in-memory blob: URLs, revoked when you clear the analysis or leave the page.
  • Credential-looking text is masked in the findings until you reveal it, and masked in the Markdown report. The CSV and JSON exports keep the OCR text as read: handle them like the store itself.

FAQ

Can this tool read Recall on a current Copilot+ PC?

Not its content. Since the reworked release (April 2025 on Copilot+ PCs), Microsoft states that snapshots and the index are encrypted with keys held in a VBS enclave and released only after Windows Hello in the user's session. The tool shows that a store exists, for whom, its size, its file times and the policies, and lists the encrypted files. It reads the unencrypted 2024 preview format and decrypted exports.

Does it decrypt anything?

No. It never decrypts a store or an export, and it offers no way around Windows Hello or the enclave. Export files that the user's own export and Microsoft's documented method already decrypted (a .jpg and a .json per snapshot) are read as they are.

How do I tell whether Recall was enabled?

On the live machine: Dism /Online /Get-FeatureInfo /FeatureName:Recall, and the WindowsAI policy keys under HKLM and HKCU. Offline: a UKP store with content shows that Recall saved snapshots for that user; AllowRecallEnablement (SOFTWARE) and DisableAIDataAnalysis (SOFTWARE and NTUSER.DAT) show what policy allowed. Each user opts in, and no public source documents where that choice is kept.

Are Remote Desktop sessions captured?

Microsoft documents that snapshots are not saved for Remote Desktop Connection (mstsc.exe), VMConnect, Azure Virtual Desktop and RemoteApp; other remote clients are saved unless they block screen capture. Whether Recall captures a session someone opened into the Copilot+ PC is not documented, and the sample shows none.

Why are some snapshots marked -wal?

ukg.db is a SQLite database. In write-ahead-log mode new rows go to ukg.db-wal first and reach ukg.db at a checkpoint, so the newest snapshots can exist only in the -wal. Collect it with the database.

Where does the sample come from?

It is synthetic: alice's store on FIN-WKS-07, the fictional workstation of the sister sites, in the 2024 preview format, with drawings of windows in place of screenshots. A real machine in September 2026 would hold an encrypted store, which the tool would list but not read.

Does the page send anything?

No file content, name, text or image. Page views and a few anonymous events (files were analysed, an export format) are counted without cookies, as the privacy policy describes.

From the blog

Read the blog
Check Recall's status, copy the CoreAIPlatform.00 store with its WAL, save the policy hives, and settle authority, privilege and third-party content first.
On a disk image of a released build, Recall content is encrypted. What you can still establish: which user had Recall, when it was saving, and deletions.
What attackers can take from a Recall store (infostealers, TotalRecall, TotalRecall Reloaded), what it gives responders, and the limits of a snapshot.