Investigating with Recall Snapshots: FIN-WKS-07
A worked example on a synthetic Recall store: alice's morning, the invoice email, the .pdf.exe opened at 09:12:07, what Recall shows and what it cannot show.
TL;DR. On the fictional workstation FIN-WKS-07, alice's Recall store shows her morning: Teams from 07:49, a workbook in Excel, an intranet page in Edge, then Outlook and, at 09:04:37, the invoice email on screen with its sender and subject. At 09:11:48 File Explorer shows Invoice_2026-0914.pdf, type Application: the .exe was hidden from her. The launch itself, at 09:12:07, falls between two snapshots and comes from the PCA launch log and BAM; the PowerShell it started at 09:12:31 never appears, because it had no window. The last snapshots are only in the WAL. The store says nothing about svc_backup, who connected over RDP from 09:59:28. One snapshot from 07:53 holds a colleague's password in a chat, which is both a finding and third-party data to handle with care. The tool on this site loads the same sample and puts it on a timeline with full-text search.
The case
FIN-WKS-07 is a fictional Windows 11 workstation used across this family of sites. On 2026-09-14, the finance user alice opens a fake invoice; later, a rogue local account, svc_backup, connects over RDP and works on the machine. The responder collects alice's Recall store and her NTUSER.DAT at 10:55:12, following the collection steps. All times are UTC.
Scenario notice. Everything here is invented: the organisation, host, people, messages, files and times, and the screenshots are synthetic drawings, not real application windows. The store uses the 2024 pre-release format, the only one readable offline, so that the method can be shown. A real Copilot+ PC in September 2026 would run a released build: its store would be encrypted, and the tool would show only the footprint described in what released builds leave.
The collection holds:
C/Users/alice/AppData/Local/CoreAIPlatform.00/UKP/{GUID}/
ukg.db
ukg.db-wal
ukg.db-shm
ImageStore/ (one file per snapshot)
C/Users/alice/NTUSER.DAT
Step 1: status and footprint
Before reading a single snapshot, establish what kind of store this is.
- Whose store. It sits in alice's profile, so every snapshot in it is of her session. No other profile has a
CoreAIPlatform.00folder, including svc_backup's, which Windows created at its first logon. - Policy. alice's NTUSER.DAT has
DisableAIDataAnalysis= 0 underSoftware\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsAI: saving snapshots was allowed for her. That is permission, not proof of use; the store is the proof (policies as evidence). - Readable or not.
ukg.dbopens as SQLite, andukg.db-walholds committed frames. The tool reads both. - Range. The first snapshot is at 07:49:20, the last at 09:41:15.
Step 2: read the morning in order
The snapshots, with the application, the window title and what the OCR text shows:
| Time | Application | Window title | OCR text, in short |
|---|---|---|---|
| 07:49:20 | Microsoft Teams | Chat - Finance team - Microsoft Teams | Morning messages between colleagues |
| 07:53:05 | Microsoft Teams | Chat - Finance team - Microsoft Teams | A colleague posts the password of a shared mailbox: Password: Synthetic-Sample-01 |
| 08:12:41 | Excel | Q3-close-checks.xlsx - Excel | Reconciliation figures |
| 08:36:02 | Microsoft Edge | Supplier payments - Finance intranet - Microsoft Edge | The URL https://intranet.corp.example/finance/payments |
| 08:58:52 | Outlook | Inbox - alice@corp.example - Outlook | The inbox |
| 09:04:37 | Outlook | Invoice 2026-0914 - payment overdue - Message (HTML) | Sender accounts@supplier-billing.example, a request to pay today, an attachment line |
| 09:11:48 | File Explorer | Downloads | Invoice_2026-0914.pdf, type Application |
| 09:12:15 | File Explorer | Downloads | The same folder, 8 seconds after the launch |
| 09:13:02 | Outlook | Inbox - alice@corp.example - Outlook | Back in the inbox |
| 09:41:15 | Excel | Q3-close-checks.xlsx - Excel | Last snapshot in the store |
Between the snapshots, the window events (created, changed, closed) narrow down when each window was open. Read them before you say how long the email stayed on screen.
Until 08:58, nothing stands out: this is the baseline of an ordinary morning, and it is worth reading, because it shows what alice's screen normally looks like and which applications she uses.
Step 3: the email and the file
The 09:04:37 snapshot is the one the other artifacts cannot give. The OCR text has the subject, the sender's address and a short text pressing for payment. Search the OCR text for the sender's domain: it appears in this snapshot only. Then take the facts to the mail system: the message in alice's mailbox or the message trace gives the full headers, the recipients and the attachment's hash.
The step between the email and the file, saving the attachment, falls between two snapshots. Recall does not show it; the file's creation time in Downloads, from the file system, fills the gap.
At 09:11:48, File Explorer shows Invoice_2026-0914.pdf with the type Application. Windows hides known extensions by default, so alice saw a PDF; the full name, Invoice_2026-0914.pdf.exe, comes from the file system and the PCA launch log. This snapshot is the best evidence of what the lure looked like to the user, which matters for the report and for the awareness training that follows.
Step 4: the launch and what is missing
The PCA launch log and BAM record C:\Users\alice\Downloads\Invoice_2026-0914.pdf.exe launched at 09:12:07. Recall has snapshots at 09:11:48 and 09:12:15, before and after: the double-click itself is not in any snapshot.
Two absences are expected:
- PowerShell at 09:12:31 was started by the invoice executable without a visible window. Recall saves what is on screen, so there is nothing to find. Prefetch, process creation events or EDR have it.
- No error message. If the invoice had shown a fake error, a snapshot taken while it was on screen would hold it. None does, which is consistent with an executable that shows nothing.
From 09:13:02, alice is back in Outlook and then in Excel. Nothing on her screen suggests she noticed anything.
Step 5: the findings
Two findings go in the report, whether the tool flags them or you find them by reading:
- A credential-looking line at 07:53:05. It is a colleague's message with a shared mailbox password, unrelated to the intrusion but now in a store that malware running as alice could have reached. Rotate that password. The line is also third-party content: show it masked, and quote it only if the case needs it.
- A file shown as a document but typed Application at 09:11:48. The lure, as alice saw it.
Step 6: the WAL
The snapshots from 09:12:15 to 09:41:15 are only in ukg.db-wal: Recall had not yet checkpointed them into the database when the store was copied. A reader that ignores the WAL stops at 09:11:48, before the launch, and misses alice's return to Outlook. Always copy the WAL with the database, and check that your tool reads it (schema and WAL).
Step 7: what the store cannot say about svc_backup
From 09:59:28, svc_backup is connected to FIN-WKS-07 over RDP. alice's store has nothing after 09:41:15, and nothing from svc_backup's session:
- Stores are per user. alice's store records alice's session, and only it.
- No public source documents Recall capturing an RDP session opened on the machine by another account. svc_backup would also have needed its own opt-in with Windows Hello, and it has no store.
- Its
mstsc.exeat 10:18:40 would be filtered by default even in a store: Microsoft excludes Remote Desktop Connection from snapshots.
The gap after 09:41:15 is consistent with alice's screen being locked, left idle or disconnected when svc_backup connected, but the gap alone proves none of these. The Security log's lock, unlock and session disconnect events, if they are audited, answer the question. svc_backup's activity comes from its own artifacts: its activity history, BAM under its SID, the PCA launch log, Prefetch and the Security log.
The timeline
| Time | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 07:49:20 | First snapshot of the day: Teams | Recall |
| 07:53:05 | A shared mailbox password visible in a Teams chat | Recall, OCR text |
| 08:58:40 | Outlook started | PCA launch log, BAM |
| 09:04:37 | The invoice email on screen: sender, subject, attachment | Recall |
| 09:11:48 | File Explorer shows Invoice_2026-0914.pdf, type Application | Recall |
| 09:12:07 | Invoice_2026-0914.pdf.exe launched from File Explorer | PCA launch log, BAM |
| 09:12:15 | File Explorer, nothing else on screen | Recall, WAL only |
| 09:12:31 | powershell.exe started by the invoice; no window | Prefetch, process creation; not in Recall |
| 09:41:15 | Last snapshot in alice's store | Recall, WAL only |
| 09:59:28 | svc_backup connects over RDP | Security log (4624, logon type 10) |
| 10:55:12 | Collection | Responder's notes |
Writing it up
- State what the store shows: "alice's Recall store on FIN-WKS-07 holds a snapshot at 2026-09-14 09:04:37 UTC of an Outlook message from
accounts@supplier-billing.examplewith the subject 'Invoice 2026-0914 - payment overdue'." Not "alice read the phishing email at 09:04". - Say which build's format the store follows, how it was read (database and WAL), and that times are UTC from the
TimeStampcolumn. - List the expected absences: the save, the launch, PowerShell, svc_backup's session. A reader should not take a missing snapshot as proof that something did not happen.
- Mask credentials and other people's messages, and keep to the agreed time window.
FAQ
Is the FIN-WKS-07 Recall store real?
No. The host, people, messages, files and times are invented, and the images are simple synthetic drawings. The store uses the 2024 pre-release format because it is the only one readable offline. A real Copilot+ PC in 2026 would run a released build, and its store would be encrypted.
Why does no snapshot show the PowerShell that started at 09:12:31?
Recall saves what is on the screen. PowerShell was started by the invoice executable and had no visible window, so there was nothing to capture. Its start comes from Prefetch, process creation events or EDR.
Does alice's store show what svc_backup did over RDP?
No. A Recall store belongs to one user and records that user's session. No public source documents Recall capturing a separate RDP session, and svc_backup, created during the intrusion, has no store of its own. Its activity comes from other artifacts.
What does Recall add to the PCA launch log or BAM?
Content. PCA and BAM say that Invoice_2026-0914.pdf.exe was launched at 09:12:07. Recall shows the email that delivered it, who it claimed to be from, and how the file looked to alice in File Explorer: a PDF, with the .exe hidden.
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Frequently asked questions
Is the FIN-WKS-07 Recall store real?
No. The host, people, messages, files and times are invented, and the images are simple synthetic drawings. The store uses the 2024 pre-release format because it is the only one readable offline. A real Copilot+ PC in 2026 would run a released build, and its store would be encrypted.
Why does no snapshot show the PowerShell that started at 09:12:31?
Recall saves what is on the screen. PowerShell was started by the invoice executable and had no visible window, so there was nothing to capture. Its start comes from Prefetch, process creation events or EDR.
Does alice's store show what svc_backup did over RDP?
No. A Recall store belongs to one user and records that user's session. No public source documents Recall capturing a separate RDP session, and svc_backup, created during the intrusion, has no store of its own. Its activity comes from other artifacts.
What does Recall add to the PCA launch log or BAM?
Content. PCA and BAM say that Invoice_2026-0914.pdf.exe was launched at 09:12:07. Recall shows the email that delivered it, who it claimed to be from, and how the file looked to alice in File Explorer: a PDF, with the .exe hidden.